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Measuring Presidential Success in 
Congress: Alternative Approaches 
George C. Edwards III 
Texas A & M University 
There are numerous obstacles to studying p)residential-congressional relations. One of the 
most difficult to overcome is measuring presidential i-- cess. This article addresses the 
theoretical significance of the choice of measures, and develops and analyzes four alternative 
indices of presidential support in Congress. It concludes that usually it is best to employ 
individual-level measures of presidential support and that, although different measures p~ro- 
duce similar results, it is useful to rely on both broad and exclusive measures in one's research. 
INTR()O)tTCRO IO.N 
The question of executive-legislative relations is central in studies of the 
presidency and of the Congress. It is important to know how powerful the 
president is in Congress, why he is that powerful, and how the executive 
and legislative branches of our national government interact. Such political 
behavior is not only interesting but also has policy consequences for citi- 
zens in the United States and other nations. Taxes, inflation, energy sup- 
plies, welfare payments, consumer protection, defense expenditures, nuclear 
arms limitations, and much more are all directly affected by the passage or 
failure of presidential proposals in Congress. Moreover, anyone interested 
in policy change or systemic reform, even if this interest does not involve 
special concern for the workings of either of these branches of the national 
government, needs to understand how they work together, because usually 
both branches must reach agreement if there is to be major change. 
There are numerous obstacles to studying presidential relations with 
Congress, including the measurement of independent variables that may 
explain them and the definition of core concepts such as "influence." An 
equally difficult problem facing scholars wishing to study presidential- 
congressional relationships is measuring presidential success. How do we 
know it when we see it? The question is crucial because some notion of 
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presidential success in the House and Senate is the dependent variable most 
studies of presidential relations with Congress try to explain. 
PASSAGE OR SUPPORT? 
The first and perhaps most important step in trying to investigate 
presidential-congressional relations is to clarify just what it is that we want 
to explain. Only then can we develop a dependent variable that is a valid 
measure of that concept. Although this may appear to be a straightforward 
or even pedestrian task, it is actually a stage at which researchers may easily 
stumble and undermine the remainder of their efforts. 
The fundamental question here is whether we are interested in explain- 
ing presidential influence or leadership in eliciting congressional support 
for his proposals or simply presidential success in obtaining passage of his 
legislation per se. Although at first glance "passage" seems at least as 
important to investigate as "support," there is less to such a study than 
meets the eye. Because success in passing legislation is an aggregate con- 
cept, the results of an analysis focused on it cannot provide a solid basis for 
inferences about the causes of congressional behavior. Instead, we are left 
with conclusions such as: presidents have greater success in obtaining 
congressional passage of their programs when they have a cohesive major- 
ity in Congress. This is correct, of course, but it is also virtually a truism and 
actually explains very little, especially about congressional behavior. We 
can make few theoretical advances in pursuing such a course. 
If the dependent variable is a yearly aggregate of presidential success in 
obtaining passage of legislation, it will mask variability in support for the 
president among individual members of Congress or groups of members. 
This level of aggregation makes inferences about the causes of behavior of 
individual members of Congress toward the president very tenuous. 
Moreover, for most purposes it makes very little theoretical sense to com- 
bine aggregate figures for the House and the Senate. 
The figures in table 1 help illustrate the problems of using aggregate 
measures of presidential success. They represent Congressional Quarter- 
iy's calculations of the president's victories on votes on which he took a 
stand. (CQ dropped its well-known boxscore of legislation passed after 
1975 because of its severe validity problems. Such boxscores present for- 
midable measurement problems that remain to be solved.) 
Examining these data, we cannot tell whether Republicans or Democrats 
or those from the North or the South respond differently to various influen- 
ces on their voting. Nor can we compare the House with the Senate. It is 
also obvious that party seats dominate the variance in victories over time, 
but there is no straightforward way to control for their impact. Without 
knowing who is supporting the president, it is difficult to understand why 
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TABLE 1 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON VOTES IN CONGRESS 
PRESIDENT YEAR % VICTORIES 
Eisenhower 1953 89 
1954 83 
1955 75 
1956 70 
1957 68 
1958 76 
1959 52 
1960 65 
Kennedy 1961 81 
1962 85 
1963 87 
Johnson 1964 88 
1965 93 
1966 79 
1967 79 
1968 75 
Nixon 1969 74 
1970 77 
1971 75 
1972 66 
1973 51 
1974 60 
Ford 1974 58 
1975 61 
1976 54 
Carter 1977 75 
1978 78 
1979 77 
1980 75 
Reagan 1981 82 
1982 72 
1983 67 
1984 66 
Source: Congressional Quarterly. 
they are doing so. In addition, measures of success share all the problems of 
support that we discuss below (see Edwards, 1980, pp. 14-15). 
Aggregate data may be useful if one is concerned with comparisons of 
political eras (Cohen, 1982), success rates of different presidents (Ham- 
mond and Fraser, 1984), or the success of proposals introduced at various 
points in the electoral cycle (Light, 1982). But the more concerned we are 
with the rigorous investigation of theoretically significant questions of 
causation, the less likely it is that aggregate measures will suffice. 
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Because of the limitations of boxscores, we are usually better off employ- 
ing measures of presidential support calculated separately for each 
member of Congress. Starting with individual-level data, we can disaggre- 
gate our analysis as much as our theory and independent variables will 
allow and compute aggregate figures for groups of representatives and 
senators when it is appropriate to do so. Beginning with one aggregate 
figure to represent behavior, on the other hand, makes it impossible to 
disaggregate it to the individual level. 
MEAStUIN(G STrrjI()l'r 
The second crucial step in exploring presidential-congressional relations 
is to develop measures of presidential support. This is not an easy task, and 
efforts to measure support inevitably raise important theoretical issues. 
One of these issues goes to the heart of attempts to understand presiden- 
tial support in Congress. The essential question is what votes to include in a 
measure of support. This is of critical importance because we want to know 
whether possible explanatory variables such as public approval or legisla- 
tive skills operate uniformly across all issues and all votes on them or 
whether they influence some issues and votes more than others. Very broad 
measures of presidential support may mask important relationships that 
may be revealed when more exclusive measures are used. Conversely, 
relationships that appear to hold across a wide range of issues and votes 
may actually be weak or nonexistent on especially significant matters. 
There is considerable controversy and little consensus on what measure 
of presidential support is most appropriate. The most commonly employed 
measure of presidential support is Congressional Quarterly's Presidential 
Support Scores. Yet scholars have often criticized this index for weighing 
all issues equally and for including lopsided votes and often several votes 
on the same issue (see, for example, Edwards, 1980, pp. 50-53; King, 1983, 
p. 253; Manley, 1977, pp. 36-52; Wayne, 1978, pp. 168-72). In other words, 
some scholars find Presidential Support Scores rather blunt measures that 
may obscure as much as they reveal. On the other hand, Sigelman (1979, 
1981) focused only on key votes, but was criticized by Shull and LeLoup 
(1981) for doing so. 
In the pages that follow we develop and compare four indices of presi- 
dential support in both the House and the Senate over the period 1953-83. 
Our goal is to obtain a clear understanding of the advantages and draw- 
backs of various ways of measuring presidential support and the implica- 
tions of using them in our research. We also want to see whether the indices 
produce distinctive results. If they do not, we can reach the theoretically 
significant conclusion that there is stability in congressional voting on 
presidential requests. Conversely, if there are distinctive differences in the 
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results, we will be in a better position to choose the measure or measures 
best suited to specific research questions. 
TIle INI)ICES 
In this section we discuss four different measures of presidential support 
in Congress. They range from the very comprehensive (Overall Support) 
to the very selective (Key Votes). Each is designed to capture a different 
aspect of presidential support, and the second, third, and fourth indices, 
which are increasingly exclusive, are designed to remedy certain draw- 
backs in the first and broadest measure. 
Overall Support 
Our most inclusive index of presidential success in Congress is Overall 
Support. It includes all the votes on which the president has taken a stand. 
The basis for determining these issues is CQ's yearly almanacs. CQ ana- 
lyzes all the public statements and messages of the president to determine 
what legislation he personally desires or does not desire. Only issues on 
which the president has taken a personal stand are included in the indices. 
Moreover, CQ includes votes only if the legislation that the president 
originally supported is voted on in a similar form; issues are excluded if 
they have been so extensively amended that a vote can no longer be 
characterized as reflecting support for or opposition to the president. 
Furthermore, the position of the president at the time of the vote serves as 
the basis for measuring support or opposition because the president may 
have altered his earlier position or changed his view after the vote took 
place. Finally, key votes to recommit, reconsider, or table are also 
included; and appropriations bills are included only if they deal with 
specific funds that the president requested be added or deleted. This latter 
point helps distinguish between the president and the institutionalized 
presidency. 
Although we rely on CQ's judgments of the issues on which the president 
has taken a personal stand, we have not simply adopted CQ's Presidential 
Support Scores. Our index of Overall Support was coded independently, 
partially because of occasional errors in the CQ calculations, partially due 
to CQ's deletion of certain votes on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and partially 
due to our handling of paired votes (discussed below). 
There are drawbacks as well as advantages to an index that measures the 
support of members of Congress on all the votes on which the president has 
taken a stand. Such an index may include lopsided votes and many votes on 
the same issue, and it weighs issues equally. To deal with each of these 
limitations of an inclusive measure of presidential support, we must 
develop a series of increasingly restrictive indices. Thus, we will employ 
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three other measures of presidential support in Congress. We should note, 
however, that there is no evidence that presidents have varied in their use of 
"posturing," that is, trying to inflate their degree of congressional support 
by proposing popular but frivolous legislation or by withholding unpopu- 
lar legislation. Although some of each has undoubtedly occurred, there 
seem to be no systematic differences among presidents. 
Nonunanimous Support 
Because many of the issues on which the president takes a stand are not 
controversial and are decided by near-unanimous votes, including them in 
a measure of presidential support can distort the results by inflating the 
measurement of support. Moreover, because the number of these votes 
varies over time, including them in a measure of presidential support can 
distort attempts to correlate the measure with possible explanatory vari- 
ables. Finally, comparisons between the House and Senate may be dis- 
torted if these votes are included because the Senate tends to have more 
unanimous votes, due, at least in part, to its special responsibilities for 
confirming appointments and ratifying treaties, most of which are not 
controversial. 
To avoid the problem of unanimous votes, we employ Nonunanimous 
Support, an index of support for the president's stands on votes on which 
the winning side received less than 80 percent of the vote. Although 80 
percent is inevitably a somewhat arbitrary figure, it is a reasonable cutoff 
point for votes on which presidential influence appears to be largely 
irrelevant. It is worthwhile to note that there are many instances of near- 
unanimous votes that the president lost. Evidently the president felt it 
necessary to take a principled stand against hopeless odds. A drawback to 
such a measure is that the overwhelming consensus on an issue may be due 
to the president's influence. Thus, we may lose useful information when we 
omit unanimous and near-unanimous votes from an index of presidential 
support. 
Single-Vote Support 
It is very often the case that there are many roll-call votes on the same 
issue. In some cases there are a dozen or more votes on one bill as amend- 
ment after amendment is decided by roll-call vote. In the most extreme 
case, the Senate took 116 roll-call votes on the 1964 Civil Rights Act. When 
one issue provides a substantial percentage of the votes on which the 
president took a stand, the potential for distortion is obvious.-The resulting 
index will be biased toward both the president's influence and the broader 
configuration of forces at work on that one issue. 
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To avoid this problem we employ Single-Vote Support, an index of the 
support for the president's stands on the most important nonunanimous 
vote (see above) on each bill. Thus, there is only one vote per bill in this 
index. If a key vote (see below) was designated for an issue, that is the vote 
we use in the index. If there were two key votes and oine was on final 
passage, we use the latter. If there were two key votes and neither was on 
final passage, the one with the closest vote was used on the theory that these 
are the best tests of the president's influence. Typically, however, there was 
no key vote designated by CQ. In this case the first choice was the vote on 
final passage of the bill. If this was not available, the most closely contested 
remaining vote was used. 
There is no objective way to determine the most important vote on a bill. 
Although passage is often the crucial vote, at other times hotly contested 
amendments or even procedural votes may be more significant. Moreover, 
by choosing among amendments on the basis of how closely contested they 
were, there is the possibility of choosing the votes on which the president 
was simply less successful and excluding votes on which he was more 
influential. We simply cannot tell. Finally, some bills, though only a few, 
cover several disparate issues. For example, consideration of the fiscal 1983 
continuing appropriations bill in the Senate included votes on the MX 
missile, the Clinch River breeder reactor, FTC licensing of professions, 
public works jobs, social security benefits, abortion funding, and funds for 
Central American guerrillas. Thus, by excluding multiple votes on the same 
issue we both avoid and create problems in measuring presidential 
support. 
Key Votes 
Each year CQ selects "key votes" that occurred in each house during the 
session. The criteria for selecting these votes are one or more of the 
following: (1) a matter of major controversy; (2) a test of presidential or 
political power; (3) a decision of potentially great impact on the nation and 
lives of Americans. A measure of presidential support relying on key votes 
is attractive because these votes represent only significant issues, and thus 
help us to avoid the problem of distorting measurements of presidential 
success with less important issues. It is possible that a president's success on 
relatively inconsequential issues may mask his failure to obtain support on 
more major matters. 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to exercise caution in the use of 
key votes. First, the president does not take a stand on all key votes. Over 
the thirty-one years covered here, the president took a stand on 73 percent 
of the key votes in the House and 66 percent in the Senate. Since 1969 the 
figures are even lower: 58 percent and 55 percent, respectively. Thus, we 
This content downloaded from 128.194.112.172 on Mon, 9 Jun 2014 16:17:32 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
674 JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 47, 1985 
cannot cavalierly employ all key votes for our study. Second, some key 
votes (7 percent in the House and 10 percent in the Senate) are unanimous 
under our definition of the winning side receiving at least 80 percent of the 
vote and thus may not be a useful test of presidential influence. Third, the 
number of key votes on which the president has taken a stand is very small, 
the yearly average in each house being nine votes. This is a very modest 
basis for generalizations about presidential influence in Congress. 
Fourth, sometimes there is more than one key vote on a single issue, 
presenting yet another of the problems we have tried to avoid earlier. 
Finally, although weighting votes equally may mask important informa- 
tion, it also has certain advantages. What appear to be the most significant 
votes are not necessarily the best tests of presidential influence or leader- 
ship. Even if we know the president's complete set of priorities (which we 
do not), and even if he had a comprehensive set of priorities (which he does 
not), each member of Congress responds to presidential requests with his 
or her own set of priorities (to the degree that the member has one). Since 
we cannot assume that the issues the president cares about most and 
therefore fights hardest for are those issues that members of Congress care 
about most, we cannot assume that these issues are the best tests of presi- 
dential influence. The president's task in such cases is not necessarily 
especially difficult, as the occasional near-unanimous results on key votes 
indicate. 
Another reason that the varying degrees of presidential effort to influ- 
ence Congress may not be a particularly serious problem is that direct 
involvement of the president and his staff is only one of several potential 
sources of influences. A number of others, such as public approval and 
party affiliation, are not manipulatable on a given issue but may be impor- 
tant influences on congressional voting. Moreover, White House legislative 
activities are frequently strategic rather than tactical. In other words, they 
are aimed at generating general goodwill and not at gaining a particular 
person's vote on a particular issue. Thus, we should not assume that presi- 
dential tactical efforts are dominant in determining congressional votes. 
The Indices in Perspective 
Because of their individual limitations, we should be hesitant in selecting 
any one of the indices to serve as the dependent variable for studies of 
presidential leadership in Congress. Rather than relying on a single mea- 
sure of presidential support, then, we may choose to employ more than one 
measure. Together they should provide a more complete picture of presi- 
dential support. Using more than one measure not only increases the 
probability of our understanding presidential influence, but it also allows 
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us to identify the types of votes that correlate most highly with different 
independent variables. 
In addition to their separate limitations, the indices also share some 
problems. They are based solely on roll-call votes, yet many significant 
decisions are made in committee and on non-roll-call votes. Although there 
is evidence that roll-call votes reflect less visible decisions (see Clausen, 
1973, pp. 19-20; Unekis, 1978), we do not know for certain. Nevertheless, 
roll-call votes typically occur on a wide range of significant issues and are 
worthy of study in and of themselves, and roll-call votes are the only 
systematic data available on the decisions of the individual members of 
Congress. 
Another problem is nonvoting. Support scores are lowered by absent 
members of Congress. Most absences are due to illnesses or official busi- 
ness, but some absences occur when members of Congress desire to sup- 
port or oppose the president but do not want to express their positions 
publicly. There is simply no way to know how to interpret absences. Thus, 
we are forced to assume that the reasons for nonvoting balance out and are 
evenly distributed throughout each house. This assumption is probably 
safe since members from each region have similar rates of voting participa- 
tion on these sets of roll calls. Moreover, those who were unable to partici- 
pate in voting because of prolonged illness, death, or resignation were 
eliminated from the analysis. Anyone voting on fewer than 50 percent of 
the votes in the Overall Support index was deleted. Unlike CQ, we count 
announced pairs the same as votes since they have the same effect. 
Moreover, this gives us a more accurate view of presidential support. 
It is important to note that each of these indices produces a score for each 
member of Congress in each year rather than a yearly aggregate for each 
house or the entire Congress. They allow us to measure the level of support 
for a president's program provided by each representative and senator or 
by any group of them; thus, we are not limited to a measure for the House 
or the Senate or the Congress as a whole. 
Computation 
Calculating each of these four measures involves a massive data- 
gathering task. We first examined each of the several thousand roll-call 
votes taken in the House and the Senate during the 1953-83 period to 
identify those on which the president had taken a stand, those that were 
won by more than 80 percent of the vote, those that were on the same issue, 
and those that were key votes. 
The next step was to calculate the percentage of support each member of 
Congress gave the president on the votes represented in each measure in 
each year. To arrive at these percentages we simply divided the number of 
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times a member of Congress voted or announced a pair for the president's 
position by the number of stands the president took. These calculations 
produced over 66,000 index scores. 
RELATIONSHIPS AMNC, T1HE INI)ICES 
Once we have calculated the indices for every member of Congress, we 
need to compare them to learn whether they measure presidential support 
in distinctive ways. Tables 2 and 3 present the averages for the entire House 
TABLE 2 
PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT IN THIE HouSE, 1953-83 (%) 
OVERALL NONUNANIMOUS SINGLE-VOTE. KEY 
YEAR SUPPORT S[TPIP(ORT SUPPORT VOTES 
1953 63 58 58 55 
1954 61 55 55 52 
1955 58 47 47 44 
1956 63 54 55 57 
1957 53 50 49 59 
1958 59 53 54 52 
1959 52 47 49 48 
1960 51 52 48 48 
1961 59 54 55 49 
1962 62 55 53 50 
1963 59 53 52 54 
1964 61 56 57 54 
1965 50 59 59 59 
1966 59 52 52 54 
1967 60 51 52 51 
1968 61 51 53 48 
1969 53 52 52 51 
1970 61 49 49 45 
1971 58 53 51 53 
1972 56 55 55 43 
1973 48 46 46 47 
1974 51 47 47 52 
1975 43 47 47 44 
1976 44 43 42 44 
1977 57 51 54 50 
1978 56 55 51 50 
1979 54 50 49 49 
1980 55 51 51 43 
1981 54 54 50 50 
1982 51 44 40 45 
1983 44 45 39 45 
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TABLE 3 
PRESIDENTIAL STPP()RT IN TIE SENATE, 1953-83 (%) 
OVERALL NONUNANIMOUS SINGLE-VOTE KEY 
YEAR SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT VOTES 
1953 58 54 55 59 
1954 58 56 55 52 
1955 66 53 51 52 
1956 58 52 52 52 
1957 64 56 52 59 
1958 58 51 51 50 
1959 52 44 42 47 
1960 53 50 54 48 
1961 58 55 54 54 
1962 58 53 51 47 
1963 60 54 53 61 
1964 62 61 53 53 
1965 61 57 53 64 
1966 55 47 50 58 
1967 60 51 52 58 
1968 50 44 47 55 
1969 56 51 54 45 
1970 56 47 44 50 
1971 53 47 48 52 
1972 56 49 48 62 
1973 49 41 38 43 
1974 48 40 44 50 
1975 56 48 47 39 
1976 50 42 40 39 
1977 63 53 55 50 
1978 57 53 51 58 
1979 62 55 60 50 
1980 56 51 51 48 
1981 66 58 60 62 
1982 60 55 49 48 
1983 60 58 53 52 
and Senate, respectively, for each of the four indices of presidential sup- 
port over the 1953-83 period. They will help to give us an overview of the 
relationships between the measures. 
Comparing Overall Support with Nonunanimous Support, we can see 
that the latter index is often not significantly lower than the former. The 
level of decline depends on the number of lopsided votes in the session 
(there were forty-nine in the House in 1967 and ninety-five in the Senate in 
1973) and the percentage of them that go in the same direction. We should 
not assume that near-unanimous votes are always in the president's favor. 
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In 1981, for example, there were twenty such votes in the House, but 40 
percent of them went against the president. 
Turning to comparisons between Nonunanimous Support and Single- 
Vote Support, we generally find very small differences between the two. 
Evidently, including more than one vote on an issue in an index of presiden- 
tial support has little impact on the measure. 
Support for the president measured by the Key Votes index is usually 
very similar to support on Single-Vote Support in the House, but there are 
differences of more than 5 percentage points in five of the years here (1957, 
TABLE 4 
NUMBER OF VOTES IN INDICES OF HOUSE PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT 
OVERALL NONUNANIMOUS SINGLE-VOTE KEY 
YEAR SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT VOTES 
1953 32 26 19 7 
1954 38 20 14 8 
1955 41 24 10 5 
1956 34 20 15 8 
1957 60 44 19 5 
1958 50 37 24 9 
1959 54 43 29 11 
1960 43 36 19 8 
1961 65 48 34 12 
1962 60 43 26 12 
1963 72 53 32 11 
1964 52 37 25 9 
1965 112 73 36 17 
1966 104 67 39 12 
1967 127 78 44 11 
1968 103 59 40 11 
1969 47 28 20 8 
1970 65 36 31 9 
1971 57 45 18 7 
1972 37 27 21 6 
1973 125 96 48 9 
1974 107 65 38 8 
1975 89 74 52 12 
1976 51 43 33 7 
1977 79 52 26 6 
1978 113 91 48 12 
1979 145 113 41 12 
1980 117 81 40 10 
1981 76 56 23 12 
1982 77 53 36 9 
1983 82 79 46 11 
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TABLE 5 
NUMBER OF VOTES IN INDICES OF SENATE PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT 
OVERALL NONUNANIMOUS SINGLE-VOTE KEY 
YEAR SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT VOTES 
1953 49 38 15 6 
1954 77 63 30 7 
1955 52 23 13 8 
1956 65 54 19 6 
1957 57 39 19 4 
1958 98 73 29 10 
1959 121 87 36 13 
1960 86 63 25 9 
1961 124 102 35 9 
1962 125 91 30 11 
1963 116 80 32 8 
1964 203 163 21 10 
1965 162 120 37 16 
1966 125 87 29 8 
1967 167 104 32 7 
1968 164 124 34 11 
1969 72 47 22 10 
1970 91 52 30 6 
1971 82 61 19 12 
1972 46 31 18 8 
1973 185 90 40 9 
1974 151 108 46 9 
1975 95 57 29 6 
1976 53 32 25 7 
1977 89 60 28 6 
1978 151 122 40 8 
1979 161 117 46 9 
1980 116 85 37 11 
1981 128 78 28 11 
1982 119 88 24 8 
1983 85 72 29 6 
1961,1972, 1980, and 1983). We should not conclude, however, that even in 
these years the Key Vote index has tapped a special aspect of presidential 
support. In 1957, for example, there were only five key votes in the House 
on which President Eisenhower took a stand. One of these was a near- 
unanimous vote on the Eisenhower Mideast Doctrine, and three of the 
remaining four votes were ones disproportionately likely to elicit support 
from the Democratic majority: two on the 1957 Civil Rights Act and one on 
Mutual Security (foreign aid) appropriations. Since the number of key 
votes in a session of Congress is always small, one or two near-unanimous or 
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deviant votes loom large in percentage terms. The number of votes in each 
index in each chamber in each year is shown in tables 4 and 5. 
Differences between the Single-Vote Support and Key Votes indices are 
typically greater in the Senate than in the House. In fourteen of the thirty 
years the differences are more than 5 percentage points, although in only 
seven years do the differences exceed 7 percentage points. As in the House, 
the inclusion of near-unanimous votes and the small number of votes 
included in the Key Votes index magnifies any real differences between the 
indices. 
When the Key Vote index deviates from the Single-Vote Support index in 
either house, there is little consistency in the direction. Thus, we cannot 
conclude that presidents typically do better or worse on those votes they 
presumably care most about. 
A second way of comparing the results of the different measures of 
presidential support is to examine them in a more aggregate form that 
TABLE 6 
AGGREGATE PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT, 1953-83 (%) 
PRESIDENT'S MEMBERS' OVERALL NONLTNANIMOLTS INGLE-VOTE KEY 
PARTY PARTY SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT VOTES 
HOUSE 
All All 55 51 51 50 
All Democrats 55 51 49 48 
All Republicans 56 50 50 51 
Republican Republicans 65 65 64 66 
Republican Democrats 46 39 38 37 
Republican All 54 50 49 49 
Democrat Republicans 40 28 29 26 
Democrat Democrats 69 69 68 66 
Democrat All 58 53 53 51 
PRESIDENT'S SENATORS' OVERALL NONLUNANIMOUS SINGLE-VOTE KEY 
PARTY PARTY SUPPORT SUPP()RT SUPPORT VOTES 
SENATE 
All All 57 51 51 52 
All Democrats 53 45 45 47 
All Republicans 61 57 55 57 
Republican Republicans 69 68 67 68 
Republican Democrats 46 35 34 36 
Republican All 57 50 49 51 
Democrat Republicans 48 39 38 39 
Democrat Democrats 64 61 61 64 
Democrat All 59 53 53 55 
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smooths out some of the inevitable yearly distortions in the measurements. 
Table 6 displays a variety of aggregate percentages for each index for both 
the House and the Senate. Because of the strong influence of party affilia- 
tion on presidential support, we include controls for both the party of the 
president and the members of Congress. 
The results are striking. Despite the substantial differences in how the 
indices are measured and the number of votes included in each year, the 
aggregate results reveal a strong consistency among the indices, especially 
among the three more exclusive ones. In no instance in the entire table do 
the differences among these three indices exceed 3 percentage points. 
A third method of evaluating the relationships among the measures of 
presidential support is to correlate them with each other. When we do so 
we must use a dummy variable to control for the party of the president 
because much of the variance in the indices, especially for party groups, 
may be the result of the changes in the party occupying the White House 
that occurred in 1961, 1969, 1977, and 1981. 
TABLE7 
CORRELATIONS (r) BETWEEN HOUSE INI)ICES OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT 
NONU.'NAMMOUS SINGLE-VOTE KEY' 
Sumroni'l' SutmP()ur VOTES 
Overall Support 
All Representatives .53 .58 .31 
Democrats .67 .64 .55 
Republicans .74 .64 .38 
Northern Democrats .86 .81 .78 
Southern Democrats .70 .62 .61 
Nonunanimous Support 
All Representatives .90 .56 
Democrats .84 .67 
Republicans .87 .51 
Northern Democrats .87 .85 
Southern democrats .90 .81 
Single-Vote Support 
All Representatives .54 
Democrats .59 
Republicans .59 
Northern Democrats .76 
Southern Democrats .71 
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TABLE 8
CORRELATIONS (r) BETWEEN SENATE INI)ICES OF PRESII)ENTIAL SUTPPORT 
NONt'NANINIMOS SIN;LE-TIE KEY 
Sum)owr S t'PPo W VOTES 
Overall Support 
All Senators .87 .73 .42 
Democrats .80 .56 .34 
Republicans .93 .69 .38 
Northern Democrats .89 .65 .51 
Southern Democrats .89 .63 .47 
Nonunanimous Support 
All Senators .81 .42 
Democrats .82 .47 
Republicans .81 .39 
Northern Democrats .78 .58 
Southern Democrats .82 .58 
Single-Vote Support 
All Senators .42 
Democrats .55 
Republicans .64 
Northern Democrats .53 
Southern Democrats .69 
The results of these computations for the entire House and Senate and for 
party groups are shown in tables 7 and 8. The correlations are typically 
quite high, although there are a few exceptions. The Senate figures are as a 
whole a bit lower than those for the House. The Nonunanimous Support 
index seems to be the most representative of the four. It has the strongest 
correlations with the others: very high correlations with Single-Vote Sup- 
port and generally strong relationships with Overall Support and Key 
Votes. 
WITIE HOUSE MEASURES OF 
PRESIDENTIAL S tIPPO(R 
From 1961 through 1967 the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses com- 
piled their own presidential support scores for each member of Congress. 
Although at first glance using these measures seems appealing, they have 
several drawbacks for our use-in addition to their existing only for seven 
of the thirty-one years of our study. 
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The White House voting scores were compiled over the years by differ- 
ent people using vague criteria. This raises substantial questions of validity 
and reliability. If we look at 1965, for example, we find that from mid- 
October to mid-November the White House developed at least seven 
different lists of the major items in the president's legislative program. This 
should give us little confidence in the selection of votes for the support 
scores. 
There is also a question of accuracy. In the 1965 Senate study the 
presidential support percentages listed for each senator are impossible to 
obtain from the data provided. Either the percentages were simply calcu- 
lated incorrectly, or there was some additional step in the calculations that 
the Office of Congressional Relations failed to report. At any rate, we can 
have little confidence in its figures. 
We should also not overlook the possibility that the voting support 
studies done in the White House were in part self-serving. For example, 
absences did not count against support scores, inflating almost everyone's 
support levels. In 1965, for example, Senator Eugene McCarthy had the 
second highest presidential support rating (98 percent) although he was 
absent from 35 percent of the votes. 
The Office of Congressional Relations' strongest objection to the use of 
CQ's support scores was the inclusion of noncontroversial votes. Since we 
have excluded these votes in our Nonunanimous Support index, we have, in 
effect, developed an index such as the White House desired-but in a more 
systematic manner. 
C0NCLTSIO()N 
In this study we have seen that it is important to be clear about what one 
wants to research. To investigate most theoretically significant questions 
about presidential success in Congress, it is best to begin with individual- 
level data. This is more suited to an emphasis on explanation than are more 
aggregate measures. 
The question of which votes to include in an index of presidential 
support is also theoretically important. The results of our analysis of the 
four measures of presidential support in Congress have been very reveal- 
ing. No matter how we compare the indices, it is clear that they have a great 
deal in common. Although this is especially true of the Nonunanimous 
Support and Single-Vote Support indices, the differences among all four of 
the indices are typically small. Presidential support seems to be due to 
factors that operate with a large degree of similarity across a wide range of 
roll-call votes. This stability in congressional responsiveness to presidential 
proposals is theoretically quite significant, and it should make us skeptical 
of emphasis on idiosyncratic or personalistic factors as fundamental expla- 
nations for presidential success in Congress. 
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Yet there are some differences between both the computation and the 
results of the indices which are important to consider. For example, Overall 
Support appears artificially to inflate support levels while Key Votes have a 
tendency to be somewhat idiosyncratic. Thus, careful researchers will 
want to employ more than one measure of presidential support when 
studying the impact of independent variables such as presidential approval 
levels in the public or the president's legislative skills on support for his 
programs in Congress. 
The best approach is probably to use the Nonunanimous Support and 
Key Votes indices in conjunction when analyzing presidential success in 
Congress. Nonunanimous Support is a comprehensive index subject to few 
distortions, while Key Votes, if used with caution, may reveal relationships 
that a broader measure masks. Single-Vote Support is not distinctive from 
Nonunanimous Support and is less inclusive, while Overall Support is too 
prone to distortion to be of much use for most purposes. 
At the same time, we should remember that although roll-call votes are 
obviously important, they only compose a segment of executive-legislative 
relations. Most important, they do not necessarily reflect strategic decisions 
in the White House regarding matters such as exploiting a public mood, 
framing a particular issue, moving an agenda early, or bypassing the 
committee structure. Thus, we need to focus our attention on how presi- 
dents attempt to structure legislators' choices in addition to the influences 
on individual decisions. 
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